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UNITED STATES V. CARONIA:  
OFF-LABEL DRUG PROMOTION AND 
FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING  
Daniel P. Rabinowitz* 
 
Off-label drug promotion is commonplace in the United States, but it is not 
without its dangers.  While the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not 
explicitly ban off-label promotion, the Food & Drug Administration (FDA)—
in order to protect consumers from unsafe and ineffective drugs—has taken 
steps to regulate it.  The FDA does so through its intended-use regulation, 
which lists the types of evidence the FDA can consider in determining 
whether a drug is misbranded.  It is a crime to sell a misbranded drug into 
interstate commerce or to conspire to do so.  On September 25, 2015, the 
FDA proposed an amendment to the regulation, which has drawn opposition 
from various industry groups due to its potential to restrict the type of speech 
that is often used in off-label promotion. 
The First Amendment challenge to the proposed amendment rests on 
United States v. Caronia, in which the FDA was prevented from using 
truthful, nonmisleading speech to convict a pharmaceutical representative of 
a conspiracy to sell a misbranded drug.  This Note examines whether the 
amendment to the regulation is permissible under Caronia.  It first contends 
that the regulation does not facially violate the First Amendment.  It further 
argues that the rule is constitutional and does not pose the same First 
Amendment issue as was seen in Caronia as long as the FDA implements it 
with care.  This Note concludes by exploring various ways that the FDA can 
constitutionally regulate off-label drug promotion under the proposed rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 15, 2009, the pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly and Company 
agreed to pay a $515 million fine.1  At the time, it was the largest criminal 
fine ever imposed on a U.S. corporation.2  This record stood for less than 
eight months—on September 2, 2009, Pfizer, another drug manufacturer, 
 
 1. Eli Lilly Fined Nearly $1.5B in Drug Marketing Case, CNN (Jan. 15, 2009, 3:26 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/15/news/companies/eli_lilly/ [https://perma.cc/RS9P-
DGZY]. 
 2. Id. 
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agreed to pay $1.3 billion in restitution to settle criminal charges.3  These are 
just two of the recent massive settlements between the government and 
pharmaceutical companies.4  Common to all the settlements is that they arose 
from the illegal promotion of drugs for unapproved, potentially dangerous 
uses. 
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), a drug manufacturer 
must prove that a drug is safe and effective for each of its intended uses before 
it can be marketed for those indications.5  This is a high bar to meet—studies 
needed to prove safety and effectiveness are expensive and often take years 
to complete, and the time it takes to get approval for a new indication can eat 
into a drug’s patent exclusivity period.6  But, while drug manufacturers 
cannot sell drugs for off-label uses, physicians can legally prescribe drugs for 
these uses.7  Given the high costs of gaining FDA approval for a new 
indication, drug manufacturers are incentivized to promote drugs to 
prescribers for off-label uses.  By doing so, a drug company can increase 
sales through increased prescriptions without waiting for FDA approval for 
these uses. 
Using drugs for unapproved reasons can be dangerous.  For example, the 
drug ketoconazole should be used only for serious infections due to its side 
effects, which include high risks of liver damage, adrenal gland problems, 
and harmful interactions with other medications.8  However, in practice, the 
drug is prescribed solely for the minor skin and nail fungal infections for 
which the FDA deems it too dangerous.9 
 
 3. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/03health.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7CL6-HLDB].  Pfizer paid a further $1 billion in civil fines. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in 
Fraud Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/ 
business/glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-billion-in-fraud-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/ 
F9VN-PPV7] (discussing how GlaxoSmithKline agreed to pay a $1 billion criminal penalty 
for promoting drugs for off-label uses); Katie Thomas, J.&J. to Pay $2.2 Billion in Risperdal 
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/business/ 
johnson-johnson-to-settle-risperdal-improper-marketing-case.html [https://perma.cc/FEK5-
7PB4] (discussing how Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay a $485 million criminal penalty and 
a $1.72 billion civil penalty due to improper off-label promotion). 
 5. An indication “refers to the use of [a] drug for treating a particular disease.” 
Omudhome Ogbru, Indications for Drugs (Uses), Approved vs. Non-Approved, 
MEDICINENET.COM, https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=20732 
[https://perma.cc/P8EG-4STE] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).  See infra Part II.A for a 
discussion of the FDA’s regulatory scheme for drugs. 
 6. See infra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label,” FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/forpatients/other/offlabel/default.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
46R2-SHU7] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (“From the FDA perspective, once the FDA 
approves a drug, healthcare providers generally may prescribe the drug for an unapproved use 
when they judge that it is medically appropriate for their patient.”). 
 8. Meghan Ross, Despite Patient Death, Off-Label Oral Ketoconazole Prescribing 
Continues, PHARMACY TIMES (May 24, 2016), http://www.pharmacytimes.com/product-
news/despite-patient-death-off-label-oral-ketoconazole-prescribing-continues 
[https://perma.cc/F9J9-EL9J].   
 9. Id.  The FDA previously approved the drug for these uses; it authorized a label change 
to remove these indications in 2013. Id.; see also Samantha Olson, Gabapentin Side Effects:  
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Historically, the FDA has had wide leeway to regulate drug manufacturers’ 
sale of medications for unapproved uses.10  However, a recent Second Circuit 
decision, United States v. Caronia,11 has thrown the FDA’s ability to do so 
into doubt.12  This decision holds that First Amendment concerns prevent the 
FDA from criminalizing off-label drug promotion that consists of truthful 
and nonmisleading speech.  While some secondary commentary treats 
Caronia as a landmark case that has nationwide applicability, it is currently 
the law only in the Second Circuit,13 and even there has been narrowly 
interpreted.14 
The FDA’s proposed amendment to the regulation regarding how the 
agency determines a drug’s intended uses15 must be analyzed against the 
backdrop of Caronia and its progeny.  The amendment introduces a new 
“totality of the evidence” standard to the regulation to find a drug’s intended 
uses, which some manufacturers fear will be used to expand the 
circumstances under which the FDA can determine the drug’s intended 
uses.16  Broadly speaking, a drug must be approved for each intended use 
before it can legally be introduced into interstate commerce for those uses.17  
If a manufacturer sells a drug for an unapproved use, then the company can 
be subject to a misbranding charge—a criminal violation of the FDCA.18 
Drug manufacturers oppose the amendment in part because they fear it will 
be used to criminalize truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech19 that is 
often used in off-label promotion.20  Criminalization of such speech violates 
 
The Dangers of Off-Label Prescriptions’ Surprising Side Effects, MED. DAILY (Nov. 9, 2016, 
6:18 PM), http://www.medicaldaily.com/gabapentin-side-effects-dangers-label-prescriptions-
surprising-side-effects-403998 [https://perma.cc/8NDH-HEWZ] (discussing a study that 
found that 80 percent of off-label prescriptions are not backed by strong scientific evidence 
and that patients prescribed drugs for off-label uses are more than twice as likely to suffer 
adverse side effects as compared to people taking drugs for their FDA-approved uses); Laura 
Perry, Alzheimer’s Drug Prescribed “Off-Label” for Mild Cognitive Impairment Could Pose 
Risk for Some, UCLA (Feb. 23, 2017), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/alzheimers-drug-
prescribed-off-label-for-mild-cognitive-impairment-could-be-dangerous-for-some 
[https://perma.cc/3GKJ-WYU7] (discussing how Donepezil, a drug commonly prescribed off 
label to slow the progression of Alzheimer’s, can accelerate cognitive decline in people with 
a specific genetic variant). 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. William S. Comanor & Jack Needleman, The Law, Economics, and Medicine of Off-
Label Prescribing, 91 WASH. L. REV. 119, 133 (2016) (“The Caronia decision is controlling 
precedent in only . . . the Second Circuit.  In forty-seven states, the FDA retains the authority 
to prohibit the marketing and promotion of off-label indications.”).   
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
 15. Meaning of “Intended Uses,” 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2018). 
 16. See infra Part I.C.  This Note uses the term “uses” to refer to FDA-approved uses but 
acknowledges that certain drugs may only be approved for one use. 
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
 18. See infra Part I.A. 
 19. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of commercial speech.  
 20. See Letter from Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n to FDA on Proposed Amendments to the 
Intended Use Regulation 1–2 (July 18, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D= 
FDA-2015-N-2002-2004 [https://perma.cc/MYF9-PAGX] (“FDA’s Final Rule is inconsistent 
with . . . the First Amendment protection that extends to [truthful and nonmisleading] 
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the First Amendment, as the Supreme Court has recognized:  “Speech in aid 
of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”21  However, other authorities hold 
that the FDA is constitutionally permitted to use truthful, nonmisleading 
speech as evidence of a misbranding crime22 as long as the government does 
not criminalize this type of speech.23  If the government cannot use this 
speech to prove a misbranding offense, then off-label drug promotion based 
on such speech can continue unabated.  However, if the government can 
permissibly use this type of speech as evidence in a misbranding case, then 
the FDA would be free to use the amended regulation to regulate off-label 
drug promotion in the appropriate circumstances. 
This Note examines whether the FDA’s amended intended-use regulation 
is permissible under the First Amendment and how the FDA can implement 
it to comply with the relevant case law.  Part I of this Note provides an 
overview of the FDA’s drug regulatory scheme and how it relates to off-label 
drug promotion, and it also discusses the relevant First Amendment law.  Part 
II explores the case law addressing what evidence the FDA may use to find 
a drug’s intended use, the Caronia decision, and reactions to Caronia.  Part 
III examines whether the proposed amendment to the regulation violates the 
First Amendment.  This Note argues that industry objections to the regulatory 
change are overblown and that if the totality of the evidence standard is not 
used to criminalize truthful, nonmisleading speech, then the regulation 
comports with the First Amendment.  It then considers different instances of 
off-label promotion and how the FDA can permissibly use the regulation in 
those situations to regulate the promotion. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF DRUG REGULATION AND 
ITS INTERACTION WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A drug manufacturer’s intended use for a drug is crucial to determining 
whether the drug is misbranded.  If the FDA concludes that a manufacturer 
sold a drug for an unapproved use, then that manufacturer may be subject to 
 
communications.”); Letter from Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. to FDA on Proposed 
Amendments to the Intended Use Regulation 3 (July 18, 2017), http://src.bna.com/q3Z 
[https://perma.cc/YY8F-KD4F] (“[T]he First Amendment permits FDA to restrict [truthful 
and nonmisleading] speech only as a last resort . . . .  Applying Sorrell and Caronia [to the 
proposed amendment to the intended-use regulation], enforcement actions for misbranding 
based on manufacturers’ truthful and non-misleading communications with healthcare 
professionals about unapproved uses trigger heightened judicial scrutiny, and fail that 
standard.”); see also infra notes 74–75. 
 21. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011); see also infra Part II.B.  
 22. See infra notes 27–39 and accompanying text. 
 23. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he First 
Amendment allows ‘the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to 
prove motive or intent.’” (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993))); see also 
Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as Drugs, 
Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended Uses,” 
82 Fed. Reg. 2193, 2209 (Jan. 9, 2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 801, 1100) 
(“[FDA] do[es] not agree with the assertion that the current case law allows FDA to consider 
speech as evidence of intended use only when it is false or misleading.”).  
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a misbranding action.  Therefore, the types of evidence that the FDA may 
consider in determining a drug’s intended use for purposes of a misbranding 
action are essential to deciding when the government can prosecute a drug 
company for off-label promotion.  First Amendment implications are 
particularly pressing:  when the government uses speech utilized in off-label 
promotion in a misbranding action, courts must consider whether this 
abridges the freedom of speech. 
Part I.A discusses the FDA’s drug regulatory scheme and the importance 
of a drug’s intended use.  Part I.B then considers commercial speech and how 
government regulations of such speech are analyzed.  Part I.C concludes by 
providing an overview of the amended intended-use regulation and industry 
concerns about its potential to illegally criminalize truthful, nonmisleading 
speech.24 
A.  The FDA’s Drug Regulatory Scheme 
Under the FDCA, drugs are, in part, “articles intended for use in the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or 
other animals.”25  All drugs must be approved by the FDA for at least one 
indication before they can be introduced into interstate commerce.26  A drug 
is misbranded when its labeling27 lacks “adequate directions for use” for all 
uses.28  “Adequate directions for use” are defined as “directions under which 
the layman can use a drug safely and for the purposes for which it is 
intended.”29  A drug’s intended use is discerned through the FDA’s intended-
use regulation.30 
While the FDA must approve each of a drug’s intended uses before a 
manufacturer can sell it to physicians for those uses, health-care providers 
can prescribe drugs for unapproved uses.31  Furthermore, the FDCA and its 
implementing regulations do not explicitly prohibit drug manufacturers or 
 
 24. Other industry concerns over the new rule include an alleged Administrative 
Procedure Act violation and Fifth Amendment Due Process issues. Letter from Paul E. Kalb 
et al. to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA, Petition to Stay and for Reconsideration 10–13, 20–21 
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2016-N-
1149-0048&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/8RPM-P9LV].  Such 
concerns are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 25. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B) (2012).  The drug definition also includes “articles (other 
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.” 
Id. § 321(g)(1)(C). 
 26. See id. § 355. 
 27. Labeling is defined as “all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon 
any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.” Id. U.S.C. 
§ 321(m).  Courts interpret the term “labeling” broadly. See Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 
345, 350–52 (1948) (finding that manufacturer-printed pamphlets and circulars that are 
shipped separately from a product and that make claims about the efficacy of the product are 
labeling under the FDCA).   
 28. 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1). 
 29. Drugs; Adequate Directions for Use, 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (2018). 
 30. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of this regulation. 
 31. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
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their representatives from engaging in off-label promotion.32  However, this 
has not stopped the government from prosecuting these actors for marketing 
drugs for unapproved uses.33  The government finds authority to do so based 
on the adequate directions for use and intended-use regulations.  When a 
manufacturer or its representative promotes a drug for an off-label use, the 
speech used in off-label promotion can give the drug a new intended use 
under the intended-use regulation.34  Since an unapproved intended use 
cannot be present on a drug’s labeling,35 the labeling now does not have 
adequate directions for all intended uses, and that lack of adequate direction 
for use makes it misbranded.36  Delivering a misbranded drug into interstate 
commerce is a crime,37 as is conspiring to do so.38  So, if a manufacturer or 
its representative sells a drug with an unapproved intended use or conspires 
to do so, then that actor commits a misbranding offense.39 
Manufacturers can seek FDA approval for off-label uses.  Before a drug 
can be sold, the FDA must approve its New Drug Application (NDA).40  The 
application must show, in relevant part, that the drug is safe and effective for 
its intended uses and contain examples of the drug’s labeling.41  After the 
FDA approves an NDA, the NDA’s owner “must notify FDA about each 
 
 32. Stephanie M. Greene, Debate, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the First Amendment, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 239, 240 (2014) (“FDA regulations do not directly prohibit off-
label promotion.”).  
 33. United States. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The government has 
repeatedly prosecuted—and obtained convictions against—pharmaceutical companies and 
their representatives for misbranding based on their off-label promotion.”).  The court then 
listed examples of such prosecutions. Id. 
 34. See Greene, supra note 32, at 241 (“Oral statements by pharmaceutical representatives 
may be used as evidence of a manufacturer’s intended use for a drug . . . .”); infra Part I.C 
(discussing the regulation). 
 35. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug 
and Biological Products, 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a)(3) (2018) (“No implied claims or suggestion 
of drug use may be made [on labeling] if there is inadequate evidence of safety or a lack of 
substantial evidence of effectiveness.”). 
 36. Greene, supra note 32, at 241. 
 37. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012) (“The introduction or delivery for introduction into 
interstate commerce of any . . . drug . . . that is . . . misbranded [is prohibited under the 
FDCA].”).  Introducing a misbranded drug into interstate commerce is a criminal offense. Id. 
§ 333(a)(1)–(2) (“Any person who violates a provision of section 331 of [title 21 of the U.S. 
Code] shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or 
both . . .  [I]f any person . . . commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead, 
such person shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than $10,000, 
or both.”). 
 38. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (“If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense 
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner 
or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy, each shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .”); see, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 
703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Caronia was found guilty of conspiracy to introduce a 
misbranded drug into interstate commerce, a misdemeanor violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) 
and 333(a)(1).”). 
 39. See supra notes 37–38.  
 40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(b); see also New Drug Application (NDA), FDA (Mar. 29, 2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapprove
d/approvalapplications/newdrugapplicationnda/default.htm [https://perma.cc/3FU5-2M9Y]. 
 41. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
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change in each condition established in an approved NDA.”42  Changes in 
labeling that reflect a new indication require FDA approval before they can 
be implemented.43 
Manufacturers are disincentivized from seeking approval for all of a drug’s 
possible uses because the approval process is expensive and time consuming.  
For example, supplemental NDAs (sNDA), which the FDA must approve 
before a manufacturer can effectuate a labeling change, are extremely 
costly.44  In 2017, a manufacturer must pay the FDA $1,019,050 for an 
approved sNDA.45  More significantly, studies needed to prove that a drug is 
safe and effective typically cost millions of dollars.46  Furthermore, the 
majority of such studies fail to prove that an off-label use is safe and effective, 
and successful studies typically take years to complete.47  Waiting for 
completion of these studies and FDA approval of an sNDA can also cut into 
a drug’s patent exclusivity period,48 which further reduces the motivation to 
 
 42. Supplements and Other Changes to an Approved NDA, 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(a)(1)(i) 
(2018). 
 43. Id. § 314.70(b)(2)(v)(A). 
 44. Id. § 314.70(a)(1)(i) (“[T]he applicant must notify FDA about each change in each 
condition established in an approved NDA beyond the variations already provided for in the 
NDA.”); FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:  CHANGES TO AN APPROVED NDA OR ANDA 24 
(2004) (providing that “labeling changes associated with new indications and usage” must be 
approved by the FDA before they can be effectuated.). 
 45. Michael Mezher, FDA Unveils User Fee Rates for FY 2017, REG. AFF. PROFESSIONALS 
SOC’Y (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/08/01/25478/FDA-
Unveils-User-Fee-Rates-for-FY-2017/ [https://perma.cc/MCR3-6QUP].  An sNDA applicant 
receives a 75 percent refund if the application is ultimately rejected. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 379h(a)(1)(D). 
 46. For example, by one estimate, a Phase 2 clinical trial costs, on average, $7 million to 
$19.6 million, and the cost of a Phase 3 trial ranges from $11.5 million to $52.9 million. Joe 
Martinez, Driving Drug Innovation and Market Access:  Part 1—Clinical Trial Cost 
Breakdown, CTR. POINT CLINICAL SERVICES (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.centerpointclinical 
services.com/blog-posts/driving-drive-drug-innovation-and-market-access-part-1-clinical-
trial-cost-breakdown/ [https://perma.cc/2XLR-U8LJ].  An sNDA must contain these studies 
for the FDA to approve a new indication. See Rachel Sherman et al., Considerations for 
Summary Review of Supplemental NDA/BLA Submissions in Oncology, CONF. ON CLINICAL 
CANCER RES. 1 (2014), https://www.focr.org/sites/default/files/Considerations%20for%20 
Summary%20Review%20of%20Supplemental%20NDA%20BLA%20Submissions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A3U3-6B9M] (“A supplemental application typically parallels the content 
of an original NDA . . . application, and includes the ‘raw’ datasets . . . from clinical trials and 
efficacy and safety analyses derived from these data . . . .”). 
 47. Step 3:  Clinical Research, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ 
ucm405622.htm [https://perma.cc/W9WZ-BV5B] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (finding that 
Phase 2 studies can last for up to 2 years and only 33 percent of drugs move past this stage; 
for Phase 3 studies, the length of time is one to four years and only 25 to 30 percent of drugs 
move to the next phase).  
 48. “[T]he term of a new patent is 20 years from the date on which the application for the 
patent was filed in the United States.” Frequently Asked Questions on Patents & Exclusivity, 
FDA (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031 
.htm#howlongpatentterm [https://perma.cc/5XVU-8WHA].  Approval of an sNDA grants a 
three-year product exclusivity period for the applicant, which can stretch beyond the twenty-
year patent exclusivity period. New Drug Product Exclusivity, 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(5) 
(2018). 
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seek FDA approval before selling a drug for an off-label use.49  Finally, 
generic competition will likely eat into profits once the patent protection and 
exclusivity periods expire.50  While the costs of approving new uses clearly 
incentivizes manufacturers to promote off-label uses, regulation of these off-
label uses raises separate free speech issues. 
B.  The First Amendment and Off-Label Promotion 
Government restrictions on the speech used in off-label promotion can 
violate the First Amendment.51  The First Amendment will not always 
invalidate these regulations, however—different types of speech merit 
different levels of protection.52  At issue in the FDA’s regulation of off-label 
drug promotion is commercial speech.  The Supreme Court has defined 
commercial speech as “speech that does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.”53  The government is constitutionally permitted to regulate this 
speech in certain situations.54  However, the ability to regulate commercial 
speech is not absolute,55 and the Central Hudson test is used to evaluate 
government restrictions on this type of speech.56 
The Central Hudson test is applicable when the FDA restricts truthful, 
nonmisleading speech.57  It must be considered both for FDA restrictions that 
 
 49. Due to the time necessary for drug development, the average market-exclusivity 
period for drugs before generic competition begins is less than fourteen years. Henry 
Grabowski et al., Updated Trends in US Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition, 19 J. 
MED. ECON. 836, 839 (2016). 
 50. See id. at 836 (noting that, “[a]fter generic entry, brands rapidly lost sales, with their 
average unit share being . . . 12% [of the] overall” market for the drug). 
 51. The relevant part of the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 52. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) 
(“The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression.”); see also Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and 
Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153, 1153 (2012) (“[N]ot all expression is included in 
the speech whose freedom the First Amendment prohibits Congress from abridging.”). 
 53. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2639 (2014) (quoting United States v. United Foods, 
Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001)).  Another conception of commercial speech is “expression 
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Cent. Hudson, 447 
U.S. at 561.  Given that speech used in off-label promotion was treated as commercial speech 
in United States v. Caronia and Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, as well as 
numerous other cases, it seems safe to assume that off-label drug promotion is commercial 
speech for First Amendment purposes. See infra Part II.B. 
 54. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the 
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful 
activity.”).  
 55. See, e.g., id. (“The protection available for particular commercial expression turns on 
the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.”). 
 56. The Central Hudson test has four steps.  A court first asks whether the regulated 
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. Id. at 566.  If it concerns lawful activity 
and is not misleading, the next question is “whether the asserted governmental interest is 
substantial.” Id.  If the interest is substantial, then the court “must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest” to decide whether the regulation is 
constitutional. Id.  
 57. See supra note 56. 
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facially restrict speech and for laws and regulations that are facially neutral 
but whose purpose is to suppress speech.58  Furthermore, “[a]n individual’s 
right to speak is implicated when information he or she possesses is subjected 
to ‘restraints on the way in which the information might be used’ or 
disseminated.”59  Finally, if a government restriction is directed at commerce 
and incidentally burdens speech, it does not violate the First Amendment.60  
Because the intended-use regulation allows the government to use speech in 
a misbranding action, thereby potentially restricting commercial speech, the 
regulation ought to be analyzed under Central Hudson.61 
C.  The Proposed Amendment to the Intended-Use Regulation 
In the current version of the intended-use regulation, “intended 
use[] . . . refer[s] to the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for 
the labeling of drugs.  The intent is determined by such persons’ expressions 
or may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the distribution of the 
article.”62  In 2015, the FDA proposed amending the rule in response to the 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act to clarify when a 
product made or derived from tobacco should be classified as a drug or a 
device, rather than as a tobacco product.63  The original proposed change to 
the regulation eliminated its last sentence, which reads, “if a manufacturer 
knows . . . that a drug introduced into interstate commerce by him is to be 
used for conditions, purposes, or uses other than the ones for which he offers 
it,” then the drug must have adequate directions for use for this other use.64  
Under the proposed amendment, the FDA “would not regard a firm as 
intending an unapproved new use for an approved or cleared medical product 
 
 58. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011). 
 59. Id. at 568 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Reinhart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984)).  The statute 
at issue in Sorrell facially restricted pharmacies from selling prescriber-identifying 
information in their possession. Id. at 552.  For the full wording of the statute, see infra note 
121. 
 60. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567. 
 61. If a restriction on speech fails the Central Hudson test, then the limitation is 
unconstitutional. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571 (“In the absence of a showing that more 
limited speech regulation would be ineffective, we cannot approve the complete suppression 
of Central Hudson’s advertising.”).  
 62. Meaning of “Intended Uses,” 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2018). 
 63. See Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as 
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended 
Uses,” 80 Fed. Reg. 57,756, 57,756 (proposed Sept. 25, 2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 
201, 801, 1100) (“Because some ambiguity surrounds the circumstances under which a 
product that is made or derived from tobacco would be regulated as a drug, device, or 
combination product . . . FDA is initiating this rulemaking . . . .”).  The rule change was 
prompted by the newly added category of tobacco products to the FDCA, which is defined as 
“any product made or derived from tobacco that is intended for human consumption.” Id. at 
57,757.  The definition excludes drugs, devices, or combinations of drugs and devices. Id.  
Since drugs and devices are defined, in part, by their intended uses, how to find a product’s 
intended use helps to determine whether it should be regulated as a drug, device, or tobacco 
product. Id. 
 64. 21 C.F.R. § 201.128.  
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based solely on the firm’s knowledge that such product was being prescribed 
or used by doctors for such use.”65 
The comment period of the rule originally extended until November 24, 
2015.66  After receiving 1717 comments on the proposed rule change,67 the 
FDA extended the comment period until December 30, 2015.68  The FDA 
then received 226 additional comments.69  After further delay, the FDA 
finally released the final version of the regulation.70  However, the 
controversy over the rule would not end here—in the proposed final rule, the 
FDA replaced the knowledge clause with a new “totality of the evidence 
standard” instead of simply eliminating it, as was originally proposed.71 
According to the FDA, the totality of the evidence standard merely reflects 
the FDA’s long-standing approach regarding what types of evidence it can 
use to find a drug’s intended use.72  The FDA views the amendment as not 
changing its regulatory approach.73  The industry reaction to the new 
 
 65. Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as 
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended 
Uses,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 57,757. 
 66. Id. at 57,756. 
 67. Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as 
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended 
Uses,” REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-N-2002-
0001 [https://perma.cc/Y5WF-BWU3] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 68. See Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as 
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended 
Uses”; Reopening of the Comment Period, 80 Fed. Reg. 74,737, 74,737 (Nov. 30, 2015) (to 
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 210, 801, 1100). 
 69. Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as 
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended 
Uses”; Reopening of the Comment Period, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/ 
document?D=FDA-2015-N-2002-0008 [https://perma.cc/2MBV-VKRB] (last visited Mar. 
15, 2018). 
 70. Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as 
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended 
Uses,” 82 Fed. Reg. 2193 (proposed Jan. 9, 2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 801, 
1100).   
 71. Id. at 2205–06 (“[I]f the totality of the evidence establishes that a manufacturer 
objectively intends that a drug introduced into interstate commerce by him is to be used [for 
off-label purposes] . . . he is required . . . to provide for the drug adequate labeling that accords 
with such other intended uses.”).  The controversy is far from over.  As of the date of 
publication of this Note, the FDA, after delaying the amendment’s effective date multiple 
times, has proposed to delay its implementation until further notice. Clarification of When 
Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination 
Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended Uses”; Proposed Partial Delay of 
Effective Date, 83 Fed. Reg. 2092, 2093 (proposed Jan. 16, 2018) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 201, 801, 1100) (discussing how the FDA delayed the effective date of the rule twice 
before proposing to delay it yet again). 
 72. Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as 
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended 
Uses,” 82 Fed. Reg. at 2204 (“These changes do not reflect a change in FDA’s approach 
regarding evidence of intended use for drugs . . . .”).   
 73. Id. at 2205.  Specifically, the totality of the evidence standard is partially meant to 
show that the FDA will not deem a manufacturer’s mere knowledge of a drug being used for 
an unapproved use as the manufacturer intending the drug be used for that use. Id. at 2206.  
2606 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
standard, however, was sharp and reflected a fear that the standard will be 
used to expand the circumstances under which the FDA can determine a new 
intended use for a drug (and therefore deem it misbranded for lacking 
adequate directions for use).74  To industry commentators, the First 
Amendment and the case law interpreting it protect truthful speech so that it 
cannot be used in a misbranding case.75 
II.  DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT USING SPEECH 
IN THE REGULATION OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION 
Courts generally hold that the FDA can find an intended use based on the 
circumstances surrounding a drug’s sale,76 “promotional claims, advertising, 
and any other relevant source.”77  Furthermore, under the Central Hudson 
test, the government can constitutionally use nontruthful or misleading 
speech in off-label promotion as part of a misbranding charge.78  It is unclear, 
however, to what extent the government may use truthful, nonmisleading 
speech in off-label drug promotion to prove a misbranding crime. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Caronia is seen by many 
as a pivotal case for off-label promotion.79  It holds that the FDA cannot 
criminalize truthful, nonmisleading speech.80  While at first blush this may 
seem to categorically prevent the FDA from using such speech in a 
misbranding case, later courts have been divided.  Some, including the 
Second Circuit in post-Caronia decisions, have held that while the FDA 
 
However, in the new regulation, knowledge of a drug being used for off-label uses can be part 
of the evidence used to find a new intended use for a drug. Id.  
 74. For example, some comments to the proposed rule wanted the FDA to contract its 
definition of intended use due to First Amendment constraints on regulating truthful speech. 
Id. at 2208–09.  Other commentators cite to Caronia to argue that the “totality of the evidence 
standard” raises First Amendment concerns. Letter from Paul E. Kalb et al., supra note 24, at 
19–21; see also supra note 20. 
 75. Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as 
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended 
Uses,” 82 Fed. Reg. at 2208–09 (“One comment stated that, under Central Hudson . . . 
government regulation of truthful speech concerning unlawful activity violates the First 
Amendment unless government regulators can [satisfy the Central Hudson test] . . . .  
[A]nother comment urged FDA to confirm that truthful and non-misleading speech cannot 
form the basis of a manufacturer’s intended use of a medical product.”); see also supra note 
20. 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 77. Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn.) (emphasis added), aff’d, 540 
F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976); see also Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239 
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 78. See supra note 56 for a discussion of the Central Hudson test. 
 79. Marcia M. Boumil & Kaitlyn L. Dunn, Off-Label Marketing of Pharmaceutical 
Products in the Wake of United States v. Caronia and United States v. Harkonen, 9 J. HEALTH 
& BIOMED. L. 385, 430 (2014) (discussing that commentators originally predicted that Caronia 
would have a large influence on the FDA’s regulation of off-label marketing); Christopher 
Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed:  The Regulation of Drug Promotion Under an 
Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 552 (2014) (“FDA’s regulatory regime for 
off-label promotion suffered a severe blow in the . . . case of United States v. Caronia . . . .”); 
see also supra note 20 (discussing industry objections to the amendment to the intended-use 
regulation).  But see supra note 13 (discussing Caronia’s limited geographic reach). 
 80. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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cannot criminalize truthful, nonmisleading speech, it can use such speech as 
evidence of a drug’s intended use.81  Other courts decline to follow Caronia 
and hold that this type of speech can underlie a misbranding charge.82 
Part II.A provides an overview of the types of evidence that the 
government can permissibly use to find a drug’s intended use in a 
misbranding action.  Part II.B then examines First Amendment restrictions 
on the government using truthful, nonmisleading speech to prove that a drug 
was sold without adequate directions for use.  Part II.C then considers post-
Caronia decisions that suggest that the government can permissibly utilize 
truthful speech in certain situations to secure a conviction. 
A.  The FDA Can Use a Wide Variety 
of Evidence in a Misbranding Case 
In Whitaker v. Thompson,83 the court held that the FDA can use the speech 
in an article’s labeling to find its intended use.84  There, the plaintiff 
attempted to sell the dietary supplement saw palmetto extract with a label 
claiming that it could treat benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH).85  The FDA 
said that this claim would render saw palmetto extract an unapproved new 
drug, as it would be intended by the manufacturer to treat BPH, which the 
supplement was not approved for.86  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia agreed with the FDA and held that that the First 
Amendment allows “the FDA to use speech, in the form of labeling, to infer 
intent for purposes of determining that Whitaker’s proposed sale of saw 
palmetto extract would constitute the forbidden sale of an unapproved 
drug.”87 
In reaching this conclusion, the Whitaker court rejected the appellant’s 
argument that the government violated the First Amendment by construing 
the FDCA to criminalize truthful speech.88  Instead, the court held that claims 
that a manufacturer makes about a product help to determine whether the 
product is a drug when the claims relate to the product’s intended use.89  
Therefore, the government appropriately determined that the speech on the 
label was evidence of the intent to sell saw palmetto extract as a drug.90  
According to the court, using speech as evidence of intent does not violate 
the First Amendment, even when doing so “renders an otherwise permissible 
 
 81. See infra Part II.C. 
 82. See infra Part II.C.  This circuit split is likely to last for the foreseeable future, as the 
FDA “is evidently concerned by the prospect that the Supreme Court would limit its regulatory 
authority if the question of off-label promotion ever came before it,” which explains the lack 
of recent FDA enforcement action over off-label promotion. Comanor & Needleman, supra 
note 13, at 133.  
 83. 353 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 84. Id. at 953. 
 85. Id. at 948. 
 86. Id. at 948–49; see also supra notes 25–38 and accompanying text. 
 87. Whitaker, 353 F.3d at 953 (emphasis added); see supra note 27 (defining labeling). 
 88. Whitaker, 353 F.3d at 953. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
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act unlawful.”91  Based on this analysis, the court found that the FDA’s use 
of the label’s claim to determine that selling saw palmetto extract would 
constitute an illegal sale of an unapproved drug was constitutional.92 
Furthermore, the FDA has not been historically limited to speech in an 
article’s labeling to establish its intended use.  In fact, the intended use of a 
product “is determined from its label, accompanying labeling, promotional 
claims, advertising, and any other relevant source.”93  This has allowed the 
FDA to, for example, find that selling nitrous oxide outside a concert makes 
the nitrous oxide an unapproved drug, even without any labeling on the 
nitrous oxide, based on the circumstances of sale indicating that the gas was 
intended to affect the structure of the human body.94  It has also allowed the 
FDA to deem vitamins sold at certain dosages drugs, instead of food, because 
vitamins sold at the levels offered by the manufacturer were used almost 
exclusively for medical reasons and had no known nutritional uses.95 
The FDA has also usually been allowed to use speech in off-label 
promotion to find a drug’s intended use.  In fact, Caronia cites a number of 
cases where “[t]he government . . . prosecuted—and obtained convictions 
against—pharmaceutical companies and their representatives for 
misbranding based on their off-label promotion.”96  For example, 
GlaxoSmithKline pled guilty to a misbranding crime for promoting the drug 
Paxil to treat depression in patients under eighteen years old, an unapproved 
population, and for promoting the drug Wellbutrin to treat sexual 
dysfunction, drug addiction, and ADHD when Wellbutrin was approved to 
treat only major depressive disorder.97  Clearly, the government can use 
speech in off-label promotion to prove misbranding.  The question is to what 
the extent the government may do so. 
 
 91. Id.  The court noted that “the First Amendment allows ‘the evidentiary use of speech 
to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent’” to support this finding. Id. 
(quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993)). 
 92. See id.  Under the Central Hudson test, the government can ban speech concerning 
unlawful activity. See supra note 56.   
 93. Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn.) (emphasis added), aff’d, 540 
F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976); see also supra note 77. 
 94. See United States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 116–117, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  The 
court specified that “[t]his case is obviously unique in that . . . the sellers did not need to label 
or advertise their product, as the environment provided the necessary information between 
buyer and seller.” Id. at 119. 
 95. Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1977).  Today, 
vitamins are considered dietary supplements for FDA regulatory purposes.  At the time 
National Nutritional Foods Association was decided, the dietary supplement category did not 
exist; it was created in 1994. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-417, § 3, 108 Stat. 4325, 4372. 
 96. United States. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 97. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 
Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-
fraud-allegations-and-failure-report [https://perma.cc/7TN9-LHH8]. 
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B.  Caronia’s Limitation on Using Truthful, 
Nonmisleading Speech in a Misbranding Case 
While the FDA has wide leeway to use a drug manufacturer’s or its 
representative’s speech and conduct to determine a drug’s intended use, its 
ability to do so based on truthful, nonmisleading communications and to then 
bring a misbranding charge has recently come into question.  The Caronia 
decision is central to the claim that the FDA is limited in using such speech 
in a misbranding prosecution.  Part II.B.1 looks at a pre-Caronia decision 
that holds that the FDA cannot restrict the release of truthful, nonmisleading 
information.  Part II.B.2 considers Caronia in detail, and Part II.B.3 examines 
a later decision’s explanation of Caronia. 
1.  An Early Assault on the FDA’s Regulation 
of Off-Label Drug Promotion 
Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman98 is a pre-Caronia case that 
limited the FDA’s ability to use truthful speech in a misbranding prosecution.  
In that case, one FDA guidance document limited manufacturers from 
holding continuing medical education conferences that discussed off-label 
uses of otherwise approved drugs.99  Another guidance document limited 
drug manufacturers from distributing textbook excerpts and article reprints 
from medical journals that address off-label uses.100  The court held that the 
seminars and written material were commercial speech.  As such, restrictions 
on their dissemination must be analyzed under First Amendment 
jurisprudence.101  The restrictions were then struck down under the Central 
Hudson test.102 
On appeal, the case was vacated.103  This happened after the FDA changed 
its interpretation of the FDCA and guidance documents. It said that 
complying with the guidance documents’ requirements created a safe harbor, 
which would protect manufacturers from having certain forms of speech used 
against them by the FDA in misbranding actions; this safe harbor stood in 
contrast to the existing policy whereby the FDA could restrict or sanction 
such speech.104  In vacating the case, the court specified that “the FDA retains 
the prerogative to use both types of arguably promotional conduct as 
evidence in a misbranding or ‘intended use’ enforcement action.”105  While 
the case has no precedential value, its holding that the FDA cannot restrict 
truthful, nonmisleading speech would later reappear in a similar situation. 
 
 98. 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated in part sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. 
Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).   
 99. See Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 57–58. 
 100. Id. at 58. 
 101. Id. at 59–60. 
 102. Id. at 65–73.  Both guidance documents were targeted at truthful, nonmisleading 
speech. Id. at 65–69. 
 103. Wash. Legal Found., 202 F.3d at 337. 
 104. See id. at 335. 
 105. Id. at 336. 
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2.  Caronia Revitalizes the Limitation on 
FDA Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion 
The principle from Washington Legal Foundation that the FDA cannot 
criminalize truthful, nonmisleading speech resurfaced in United States v. 
Caronia.106  In Caronia, Orphan Medical hired Alfred Caronia to promote 
the drug Xyrem.107  The FDA approved Xyrem to treat narcolepsy patients 
who also suffer from cataplexy, as well as “narcolepsy patients with 
excessive daytime sleepiness.”108  Caronia was recorded promoting the drug 
for various off-label uses to prospective prescribers, including promoting 
Xyrem for patients under sixteen years old, for whom the drug is not 
approved.109  The jury found Caronia guilty of conspiring to introduce a 
misbranded drug into interstate commerce.110 
The Second Circuit vacated Caronia’s conviction.111  The majority found 
that “the government and the FDA have construed the FDCA’s misbranding 
provisions to prohibit off-label promotion by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.”112  The majority held such a construction unconstitutional 
under the Central Hudson test.113  In finding that the government construed 
the FDCA to criminalize speech (instead of using speech as evidence of the 
intent to commit a misbranding crime), the court first pointed to an FDA draft 
guidance document that stated that “[a]n approved drug that is marketed for 
an unapproved use (whether in labeling or not) is misbranded because the 
labeling of such drug does not include ‘adequate directions for use.’”114 
The majority then focused on the government’s conduct at trial to show 
that Caronia was prosecuted for his speech.  For example, the court noted that 
the government repeatedly argued that mere off-label promotion constitutes 
criminal conduct.115  The court also discussed the fact that “[t]he government 
 
 106. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 107. Id. at 155–56. 
 108. Id. at 155. 
 109. Id. at 156–57. 
 110. Id. at 159.  Caronia was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 371(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). 
Id.; see supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 111. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 169.  
 112. Id.  By contrast, the government contended that it did not construe the FDCA to 
criminalize speech—instead, it claimed that it used the speech as evidence of the intent to sell 
Xyrem for off-label uses, meaning that it was sold without adequate directions for use. Id. at 
160–61. 
 113. The court found that this construction of the FDCA both did not directly advance 
substantial government interests and was not narrowly tailored to achieving them. Id. at 166–
69. 
 114. Id. at 155 (alteration in original) (quoting Guidance for Industry:  Good Reprint 
Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference 
Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical 
Devices, FDA (Jan. 2009), https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ 
ucm125126.htm [https://perma.cc/WLX3-SGL7]. 
 115. Id. at 161.  The government argued, for example, that “[Caronia] knew the rules:  you 
can’t promote and market Xyrem for uses that have not been approved by the FDA” because 
“[t]hat’s misbranding.  That’s promoting and marketing a drug by a pharmaceutical company 
representative for [unapproved uses].” Id. at 158 (statements of government counsel from the 
record). 
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never argued . . . that the promotion was evidence of intent . . . .  The 
government never suggested . . . that Caronia conspired to place false or 
deficient labeling on a drug.”116  Finally, the jury instructions made it clear 
that Caronia was convicted for his speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.117  The Caronia majority concluded that “the government 
cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives 
under the FDCA for speech promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-
approved drug.”118  To the court, the government erred because its “theory 
of prosecution identified Caronia’s speech alone as the proscribed 
conduct.”119 
The majority based its finding that the government unconstitutionally 
burdened speech on Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.120  In Sorrell, a Vermont 
statute prohibited the sale, disclosure by pharmacies for marketing use, and 
use by pharmaceutical manufacturers of information revealing the 
prescribing practices of doctors.121  In holding the statute unconstitutional, 
the Court argued that the law facially imposed content- and speaker-based 
restrictions on commercial speech.122  It was content based because it 
disfavored, for example, speech used in marketing (as opposed to using the 
information for educational purposes), and it was speaker based because it 
disfavored certain speakers, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers.123  
Because the statute imposed these restrictions on speech, it was subject to 
Central Hudson scrutiny, which it failed.124 
The Caronia majority applied Sorrell to find that the government 
construed the FDCA’s misbranding provisions to impose content- and 
speaker-based restrictions on speech.125  The construction was content-based 
 
 116. Id. at 161.  
 117. The district court’s jury charge stated that a “misbranded drug may be shown by a 
promotion of the drug by a distributor for an intended use different from the use for which the 
drug was approved by the [FDA].” Id. at 159 (alteration in original).  The majority opinion 
also noted that “the district court flatly stated to the jury that pharmaceutical representatives 
are prohibited from engaging in off-label promotion.” Id. at 161. 
 118. Id. at 169. 
 119. Id. at 159. 
 120. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 121. Id. at 557.  The full statute states: 
A health insurer, a self-insured employer, an electronic transmission 
intermediary, a pharmacy, or other similar entity shall not sell, license, or exchange 
for value regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable information, nor 
permit the use of regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable information 
for marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the prescriber consents . . . .  
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall not use 
prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or promoting a prescription drug 
unless the prescriber consents . . . . 
Id. at 558–59.  The penalties for violating the statute were not criminal. Id. at 559. 
 122. Id. at 563–64. 
 123. Id. at 564. 
 124. See id. at 566, 571–72. 
 125. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 2012).  The court applied the 
Central Hudson test, even though Sorrell was not clear as to what level of heightened scrutiny 
applies when a government regulation on commercial speech is content- and speaker-based. 
Id. at 164–65. 
2612 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
because “speech about the government-approved use of drugs is permitted, 
while certain speech about the off-label use of drugs . . . is prohibited.”126  It 
was speaker-based because it targets pharmaceutical manufacturers, while 
others do not have their speech restricted.127  Based on these restrictions, the 
statute was subject to the Central Hudson test, under which it was found to 
violate the First Amendment.128 
The opinion in Caronia was not unanimous.  In her dissent, Judge Debra 
Livingston, rather than finding that the government prosecuted Caronia for 
his speech, characterized the government’s use of Caronia’s speech as mere 
evidence of Xyrem’s intended use.129  She disagreed that the jury instructions 
told the jury that Caronia could be convicted for his speech alone.  Rather, 
she argued that the instructions, taken as a whole, explained that Caronia 
could be convicted only for a conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into 
interstate commerce.130  She noted that speech alone was insufficient to 
convict Caronia—rather, “if the jury had concluded there was a reasonable 
doubt as to whether Caronia . . . intended to . . . introduce [Xyrem] into 
interstate commerce—then Caronia could not have been convicted . . . no 
matter what he said.”131  Judge Livingston compared the case to Whitaker to 
emphasize that the FDA could use speech as evidence of a drug’s intended 
use without running afoul of the First Amendment—that is, that the Central 
Hudson test was not needed.132  Given the lack of unanimity in Caronia, a 
later decision examining it is useful to determine what it truly stands for. 
3.  Amarin Elaborates on Caronia and Explains Its 
Interaction with the Elements of a Misbranding Crime 
Caronia was analyzed in Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA.133  In Amarin, the 
FDA refused a manufacturer’s request to approve the drug Vascepa for a new 
indication.134  The drug was originally approved to treat patients with 
triglyceride levels above 500 mg/dL135 of blood; Amarin sought further 
approval for Vascepa to treat those with triglyceride levels between 200 and 
499 mg/dL of blood.136  The FDA communicated to Amarin that it would 
 
 126. Id. at 165. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. at 164. 
 129. See id. at 172 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (“I disagree that the government prosecuted 
Caronia for his speech.”). 
 130. See id. at 173. 
 131. Id. at 176. 
 132. See id. at 177.  Judge Livingston then proceeded to apply the Central Hudson test in 
the event that using speech as evidence of intent is not necessarily constitutionally permissible. 
Id.  She found that the use of speech as evidence of the intent to commit a crime did not violate 
the First Amendment in Caronia. Id. at 177–81.  
 133. 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 134. Id. at 211–12.   
 135. “Mg/dL” means milligrams per deciliter.  It “is a measurement that indicates the 
amount of a particular substance . . . in a specific amount of blood.” What Does Mg/dL Mean, 
WebMD (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.webmd.com/diabetes/qa/what-does-mgdl-mean 
[https://perma.cc/58LN-BW75].  
 136. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. at 209. 
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deem Vascepa misbranded if the manufacturer marketed the drug for use in 
those with the lower triglyceride levels before approval of its sNDA.137  The 
information that Amarin relied on in requesting approval—and that it would 
convey to doctors—for the unapproved use consisted of truthful information 
derived from studies requested by the FDA, which showed that Vascepa did 
indeed reduce triglyceride levels in those with levels between 200 and 499 
mg/dL of blood.138  The FDA rejected the sNDA, despite the triglyceride 
level reduction, because there was no evidence that the reduction lowered the 
risk of cardiovascular issues.139 
In Amarin, Judge Paul Engelmayer relied on Caronia to hold that the FDA 
could bring a misbranding action, or threaten to do so, based solely on truthful 
speech used in off-label promotion.140  Holding that Caronia was not limited 
to its facts,141 Judge Engelmayer read Caronia to mean that speech could be 
used to find the intent to commit a misbranding offense, but it could not be 
the actus reus in a criminal misbranding allegation.142  For example, speech 
can be used as evidence of the intent to commit a misbranding crime if the 
promotion consisted of more than just speech, like paying doctors money or 
buying them expensive vacations.143  To this court, “Caronia does not limit 
the Government’s ability to use promotional speech to establish intent in a 
misbranding action with a proper actus reus.”144  This interpretation appears 
to be supported by post-Caronia Second Circuit decisions and opinions from 
other courts. 
C.  How Far Does Caronia’s Prohibition on Using 
Speech in a Misbranding Case Extend? 
Caronia has not been universally accepted as categorically preventing the 
FDA from using truthful, nonmisleading speech in a misbranding case.  This 
position is seen in the Second Circuit, which issued the Caronia opinion.  For 
example, in United States v. Kaziu,145 the Second Circuit cited to Caronia to 
show that where jury instructions specify that speech shows only a mental 
state and is not on trial, the First Amendment does not prevent that speech 
from being used to prove an element of a crime.146  While Kaziu was 
 
 137. See id. at 212.  For a discussion of the sNDA, see supra notes 44–49 and 
accompanying text. 
 138. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 211. 
 139. Id. at 211–12. 
 140. Id. at 224. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 227–28. 
 143. Id. at 228.  
 144. Id. 
 145. 559 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 146. Id. at 35.  Kaziu was an appeal from a conviction for providing material support to a 
foreign terrorist organization and for various conspiracies. Id. at 34–35.  The Second Circuit 
allowed speech to be used to prove the defendant’s mental state when the jury instructions 
specified that the defendant was not on trial for his extremist views and that the speech 
indicating such views was not sufficient to find the defendant guilty without proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant conspired to provide material support to a terrorist 
organization and conspired to murder in a foreign country. Id. at 35–36. 
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nonprecedential, a later case, United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc.,147 
indicates that the Second Circuit does not view Caronia as categorically 
preventing the use of truthful speech in a misbranding case.  In that decision, 
the court specified that “Caronia left open the government’s ability to prove 
misbranding on a theory that promotional speech provides evidence that a 
drug is intended for [an off-label] use.”148 
District courts in the Ninth Circuit also tend to agree that truthful, 
nonmisleading speech can be used to prove a misbranding crime.  These 
opinions rest on the holding of Carson v. Depuy Spine, Inc.149  While that 
case is nonprecedential and used the FDCA as the predicate violation for a 
negligence per se theory, the court held that promoting a “Class III” medical 
device150 for an unapproved use violates the FDCA.151  Although Carson 
was decided before Caronia, the district courts in the Ninth Circuit have had 
ample opportunity to evaluate off-label drug promotion post-Caronia.  These 
courts have not come to a unanimous decision about whether Caronia 
prevents the FDA from using truthful, nonmisleading speech in a 
misbranding case.152  However, the majority of courts within the circuit hold 
that the FDCA prohibits off-label promotion.153 
Courts of other jurisdictions have also considered off-label promotion in 
light of Caronia.  For example, in Markland v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc.,154  
the Middle District of Florida noted that “it is generally accepted that a 
manufacturer’s off-label promotion of a drug runs afoul of federal law.”155 
In so holding, the court noted that there is currently no consensus about 
whether the FDCA prohibits off-label promotion.156 
 
 147. 822 F.3d 613 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 148. Id. at 615 n.2. 
 149. 365 F. App’x 812 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 150. Medical devices are not discussed in this Note, but the same intended-use analysis 
applies to drugs and medical devices. See Gregory Gentry, Criminalizing Knowledge:  The 
Perverse Implications of the Intended Use Regulations for Off-Label Promotion Prosecutions, 
64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 441, 442 (2009) (“Intended use is defined similarly for both drugs and 
medical devices.”). 
 151. Carson, 365 F. App’x at 815. 
 152. See, e.g., Schuler v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 14-cv-00241-R, 2014 WL 988516, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014) (“[F]ederal law does not bar off-label promotion . . . .”). 
 153. See, e.g., United States v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1038 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 
2016) (“[I]t is generally viewed that off-label marketing is unlawful.”); Jones v. Medtronic, 
89 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1058 (D. Ariz. 2015) (“This Court agrees with ‘the majority of courts in 
[the Ninth] Circuit which have determined that the FDCA prohibits off-label promotion . . . .’” 
(quoting Beavers-Gabriel v. Medtronic, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1034 (D. Haw. 2014))); 
Hawkins v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 13-cv-00499, 2014 WL 346622, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30 
2014) (“The Ninth Circuit has considered [off-label promotion under the FDCA] and found 
that off-label promotion is unlawful. . . .  Although [Carson v. Depuy Spine, Inc. is] not 
binding, this Court finds the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning persuasive.”).  
 154. 270 F. Supp. 3d 1318 (M.D. Fla. 2017).  
 155. Id. at 1325. 
 156. Id. at 1326 n.4.  The court discussed that while Caronia prevents the FDCA from 
criminalizing speech in a misbranding criminal prosecution, the Ninth Circuit does not 
universally take such a view. Id.  The court also noted that a Southern District of Texas 
decision discusses the lack of clarity over whether truthful off-label promotion is banned by 
the FDA, as opposed to only false and/or misleading off-label promotion. Id. 
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III.  CAN THE FDA USE TRUTHFUL, NONMISLEADING 
SPEECH IN A MISBRANDING CASE? 
Caronia clearly limits the FDA’s ability to use truthful, nonmisleading 
speech in a misbranding case.  However, it is unclear how broad this 
limitation is.  Since Caronia focused on the jury believing that the FDCA 
bans off-label promotion and the law challenged in Sorrell restricted speech 
based on its speaker and content, this Part argues that the government is not 
completely barred from using truthful, nonmisleading speech in a 
misbranding case.  It argues that the government may use this speech as long 
as it is not criminalized and is not the only evidence used to prove a 
misbranding offense.  Part III.A contends that Caronia does not prohibit the 
use of truthful, nonmisleading speech in a misbranding case and is instead 
the product of the unique circumstances of that case.  Part III.B argues that 
the new intended-use regulation does not facially violate the First 
Amendment, while Part III.C discusses how the FDA can carry out the 
amended regulation without raising an as-applied issue. 
A.  Caronia Does Not Prevent the FDA from Using Truthful, 
Nonmisleading Speech as Evidence in a Misbranding Case 
Caronia focused on the jury believing that Alfred Caronia could be 
convicted of a conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate 
commerce based solely on his off-label promotion.157  When viewed in light 
of the FDA’s historical ability to use a wide variety of evidence to find a 
drug’s intended use, Caronia should not be construed as categorically 
banning the government from using truthful, nonmisleading speech to prove 
a misbranding offense.  Sorrell dictates that this type of speech cannot be the 
only evidence used to convict one of a conspiracy to introduce a misbranded 
drug into interstate commerce.  But, it does not prevent the government from 
using speech in off-label promotion as part of the evidence to prove such a 
conspiracy.  Part III.A.1 examines Caronia in light of the cases that allow the 
FDA to use a wide variety of information to determine a drug’s intended use.  
Part III.A.2 then argues that Caronia applied Sorrell to invalidate Caronia’s 
conviction because of how the government argued its case and the trial 
court’s jury instructions.  Next, Part III.A.3 considers the implications of 
Amarin’s discussion of Caronia. 
1.  Caronia Breaks with a Long Line of Cases That Allow the Government 
to Use Any Relevant Source to Determine a Drug’s Intended Use 
Caronia breaks with the long-standing idea that the government can use a 
drug’s “label, accompanying labeling, promotional claims, advertising, and 
any other relevant source” to find its intended use.158  The cases supporting 
this proposition have allowed the government to determine a drug’s intended 
 
 157. See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text. 
 158. Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn.), aff’d, 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 
1976); see also supra note 77. 
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use both from claims made about the product and from the circumstances of 
sale.159  Based on this precedent, Caronia cannot mean that the government 
is always barred from using truthful speech in a misbranding case.160 
First, in Caronia, the government used speech that made claims about a 
drug to find its intended use, which is analogous to Whitaker, where the court 
looked to claims in a drug’s label to determine the drug’s intended use.161  
Furthermore, the circumstances of Caronia (a drug representative discussing 
off-label uses with a prospective doctor-purchaser of Xyrem) indicate that 
the discussion was meant to promote Xyrem for off-label uses.  This is similar 
to United States v. Travia,162 where the circumstances of selling nitrous oxide 
outside of a concert allowed the FDA to find that the gas was intended to be 
used as a drug.163 
These are but a few of the cases in which the FDA used a wide range of 
information, including speech, to find a drug’s intended use.164  In fact, in 
Caronia, the Second Circuit recognized the government’s repeated 
successful prosecutions of pharmaceutical companies and their 
representatives for off-label promotion.165  Under these cases, the Second 
Circuit should have found that Caronia’s prosecution was permissible.  
However, according to the court, Sorrell compelled it to find that Caronia’s 
conviction violated the First Amendment.166  The Second Circuit was correct 
in applying Sorrell but only because of the unique circumstances of Caronia. 
2.  Sorrell Dictated That Caronia’s Conviction Be Overturned Because of 
How the Government Argued Its Case in Caronia 
Caronia applied the Sorrell standard because the jury instructions and the 
way the government argued the case made it appear to the jury that the FDCA 
bans speech.167  Sorrell involved a state law that facially restricted speech—
once a certain speaker spoke certain information, that speaker was subject to 
civil penalties.168  By contrast, the FDCA has no such provision.169  Instead, 
the regulations implementing it merely allow the government to use speech 
as evidence of a drug’s intended use.  The intended use can then be used to 
support a misbranding charge only if the misbranded drug was introduced 
into interstate commerce or there was a conspiracy to do so.170  Under the 
 
 159. See supra Part II.A. 
 160. See supra notes 27–39 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 83–92 and accompanying text. 
 162. 180 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 163. Supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
 164. See supra note 77. 
 165. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 167. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he government’s 
summation and the district court’s instruction left the jury to understand that Caronia’s speech 
was itself the proscribed conduct.”); see also supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra Part I.A. 
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wording of the FDCA and its implementing regulations, speech is not 
criminalized. 
That is not, according to Caronia, how the government construed the 
FDCA.  Caronia focused on the government arguing that a crime occurs 
when a drug manufacturer or its representative promotes a drug for an off-
label use.171  It also discussed the jury instructions, which made it appear to 
the jury that it could convict Caronia of a crime based solely on his speech.172  
Therefore, Caronia applied the Central Hudson test because the majority 
viewed the government’s construction of the FDCA to do what the statute in 
Sorrell did—to ban speech based on its speaker and content.173  This view 
was not unanimously held in Caronia.  Judge Livingston, who dissented, did 
not find that the government argued that the FDCA bans off-label promotion.  
Instead, she thought that the jury instructions made it clear that the FDCA 
contains no such prohibition and that speech was merely used as evidence of 
a crime, which does not violate the First Amendment.174 
Given the focus of Caronia on the jury believing that the FDCA bans 
speech, it should not be interpreted as categorically prohibiting the 
government from using truthful speech in a misbranding prosecution.  Its 
holding as applied to the facts of Caronia is correct, but it should be limited 
to situations where speech is criminalized based on its speaker and content 
(or appears to be to a jury), not where speech is used as evidence of a crime.  
The issue in Caronia was not the use of speech in a misbranding action—
instead, it was the government’s argument that speech alone allowed the jury 
to convict Alfred Caronia of a conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into 
interstate commerce.175 
Therefore, had the government argued that speech was evidence of the 
intent to commit a misbranding offense and specified that speech alone could 
not convict Caronia, the case would no longer be akin to Sorrell because 
speech would not be restricted based on its speaker and content.  This position 
is supported by the Second Circuit’s post-Caronia decisions.  By citing to 
Caronia and holding that it allows the government to prove misbranding by 
using promotional speech as evidence of a drug’s intended use, the Second 
Circuit does not seem to agree that Caronia and Sorrell always prevent the 
government from using truthful, nonmisleading speech in a misbranding 
case.176 
 
 171. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 173. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e conclude that the 
government’s construction of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions imposes content- and 
speaker-based restrictions on speech . . . .”).  See supra note 121 for the wording of the statute 
at issue in Sorrell. 
 174. See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text. 
 175. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 161 (“[T]he government clearly prosecuted Caronia for his 
words—for his speech.”). 
 176. See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text. 
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3.  Amarin’s Discussion of Caronia Suggests That Caronia Will Not 
Significantly Interfere with the Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion 
Amarin holds that, under Caronia, truthful speech can support mens rea in 
a misbranding allegation, but it cannot be the actus reus.177  Therefore, 
according to Amarin, when off-label promotion consists solely of truthful 
speech, the FDA cannot bring a misbranding charge against the speaker.178  
In such a situation, speech is effectively criminalized—it alone is sufficient 
to convict one of a misbranding offense. 
This position is correct.  Under the FDCA, the actus reus of a misbranding 
offense is the introduction of a drug into interstate commerce or a conspiracy 
to do so.179  So, under the FDCA, the misbranding provisions do not hold 
that speech is criminalized.  Speech does not, and cannot, result in a 
conviction without the actus reus of selling a drug into interstate commerce 
or conspiring to do so.  This was the issue in Caronia—the government used 
speech as the actus reus to find a conspiracy to sell a misbranded drug.180 
Amarin, therefore, found that Caronia means that truthful speech, without 
any other evidence, cannot be used to convict one of a conspiracy to sell a 
misbranded drug.181  This should not significantly limit the government’s 
ability to regulate off-label promotion through the intended-use regulation, 
however.  Speech does not occur in a vacuum, and Amarin recognizes that 
truthful speech, combined with other evidence of a conspiracy, allows the 
government to successfully bring a misbranding case.182 
B.  The Amended Intended-Use Regulation Does Not, 
on Its Face, Violate the First Amendment 
The amendment to the intended-use regulation does not facially violate the 
First Amendment.  The regulation, unlike the law in Sorrell, does not 
criminalize speech—instead, it discusses the evidence the FDA can use to 
find a drug’s intended use.183  Therefore, unlike the statute in Sorrell and the 
government’s construction of the FDCA in Caronia, the amended regulation 
does not impose content- and speaker-based restrictions on speech.  Instead, 
 
 177. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 180. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[Caronia] 
turned on the actus reus requirement.  And Caronia’s holding was that the FDCA’s 
misbranding provisions cannot constitutionally criminalize, and therefore do not reach, the act 
of truthful and non-misleading speech promoting off-label use.”); see also supra note 119 and 
accompanying text. 
 181. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 228. 
 182. The court gave examples of when a proper actus reus is present, like if “a manufacturer 
paid doctors money or bought them resort vacations . . . to reward them for prescribing a drug 
for offlabel use.” Id.  
 183. Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as 
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended 
Uses,” 82 Fed. Reg. 2193, 2217 (proposed Jan. 9, 2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 
801, 1100). 
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it is an evidentiary tool that allows the FDA to use speech to find a drug’s 
intended use. 
This is true of the “totality of the evidence” standard in the regulation.  
Manufacturers claim that the new standard can chill speech,184 and in Sorrell, 
the Court held that a facially neutral law whose purpose is to chill speech 
must be analyzed under the First Amendment.185  This issue does not arise 
under the amended intended-use regulation because the FDA has stated that 
the amendment will not change the FDA’s approach to finding a drug’s 
intended use.  By doing so, it has alerted drug companies that the new 
regulation’s purpose is not to criminalize speech.186  So, there should be no 
fear that words alone will result in a criminal prosecution.  Therefore, the 
“totality of the evidence” standard, before the FDA enforces it, does not 
implicate the First Amendment as it does not restrict speech.187  However, 
given the success of an as-applied challenge in Amarin (and Caronia seems 
to be an as-applied challenge to how the government enforced the FDCA), 
the FDA must carry out the regulation with care to avoid the issue that it 
faced in Caronia.188 
C.  How Should the FDA Carry Out the 
Amended Intended-Use Regulation? 
The government cannot argue that truthful speech that makes a drug 
misbranded under the intended-use regulation is sufficient for a misbranding 
conviction.189  The court in Caronia ruled as it did because the jury believed 
that the FDCA restricts speech, and under Sorrell, restrictions on speech 
based on speaker and content are subject to Central Hudson scrutiny.190  So, 
if the government argues, as it did in Caronia, that speech in off-label 
promotion is sufficient to convict one of a conspiracy to sell a misbranded 
drug,191 it would be tantamount to arguing that speech is always restricted 
when a pharmaceutical company representative discusses off-label drug 
usage with a doctor.  This is the type of content- and speaker-based restriction 
on speech that implicates the First Amendment under Caronia and Sorrell.192 
 
 184. Letter from Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n, supra note 20, at 1 (“[T]he Final Rule will 
create substantial confusion . . . and could thereby chill crucial interactions . . . .”). 
 185. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011) (“Even if the hypothetical 
measure on its face appeared neutral as to content and speaker, its purpose to suppress speech 
and its unjustified burdens on expression would render it unconstitutional.”). 
 186. Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as 
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended 
Uses,” 82 Fed. Reg. at 2204 (“The[] changes [to the intended-use regulation] do not reflect a 
change in FDA’s approach regarding evidence of intended use for drugs . . . .”). 
 187. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 188. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[Amarin] 
brought an as-applied First Amendment challenge to FDA regulations that prohibit Amarin 
‘from making completely truthful and non-misleading statements about its product to 
sophisticated healthcare professionals’ . . . .”). 
 189. See supra notes 27–39 and accompanying text for a discussion of misbranding. 
 190. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 122, 125, 128 and accompanying text. 
2620 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
Therefore, it is crucial that the government make clear at trial that truthful, 
nonmisleading speech alone is not enough to convict in a misbranding case 
and cannot serve as the sole evidence of a conspiracy to introduce a 
misbranded drug into interstate commerce.  The government should always 
tell a jury that the FDCA does not ban speech.  It should also emphasize that 
even if a drug is misbranded because of off-label promotion, speech alone 
cannot prove a conspiracy to sell the drug.  These precautions should prevent 
a court from finding that the government construed the FDCA to ban speech, 
which would likely violate the First Amendment.193 
Furthermore, as explained by Amarin, speech cannot be the actus reus 
when the government alleges a conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug 
into interstate commerce, even if the government does not argue that speech 
is criminalized.194  One way the government may be able to find a proper 
actus reus is to make an argument about the circumstances of sale, like in 
Travia.195  The circumstances of a sales representative discussing a drug’s 
unapproved uses with a prospective doctor-purchaser of the drug (as seen in 
Caronia), combined with speech advocating off-label usage that makes the 
drug lack adequate directions for use, may be enough to convince a jury of a 
conspiracy to sell a misbranded drug.  The actus reus of the conspiracy is the 
representative discussing off-label uses with a potential purchaser of the 
drug, with the speech also showing that the drug is misbranded and that the 
conversation occurred as part of the conspiracy. 
However, Travia was decided before Sorrell, and Sorrell bars the 
government from using the identity of the speaker and how the recipient of 
the speech plans to use the speech (i.e., the content of the speech) as the sole 
evidence of a conspiracy to sell a misbranded drug.196  Post-Sorrell, it 
appears that convicting a representative who engages in promotion based on 
speech alone is tantamount to imposing speaker- and content-based 
restrictions on speech.  There will be a conviction under the intended-use 
regulation whenever a sales representative talks about off-label promotion 
with a doctor, even when the government did not argue that speech is 
criminalized.  Therefore, the government must introduce evidence besides 
speech as the actus reus of a conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into 
interstate commerce.197 
It should not be difficult for the government to find a proper actus reus in 
many cases.  Certain actions besides speech are clearly sufficient to serve as 
the actus reus of a conspiracy.  For example, Amarin noted that if a 
manufacturer pays doctors money or buys them resort vacations in 
 
 193. Whether the restriction is unconstitutional is based on an application of the Central 
Hudson test.  However, since such a construction failed the test in Caronia and content- and 
speaker-based restrictions on speech failed the test in Sorrell and in Washington Legal 
Foundation, it seems safe to assume that a future construction of the FDCA to ban truthful 
speech would also pose a high likelihood of being found unconstitutional. See supra Parts 
II.A–B.  
 194. See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
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conjunction with off-label promotion, then the manufacturer’s truthful 
statements used in the promotion can show the intent to conspire to sell drugs 
for unapproved uses.198  In such situations, the actus reus is a gift, not speech, 
so there is no First Amendment issue.  The speech shows that off-label 
promotion made the drug misbranded for lacking adequate directions for 
use.199  The same speech also serves as the mens rea to explain why the gift 
was given. 
Other evidence should also be sufficient to be the actus reus.  The key is 
that the government must find evidence of a nonspeech act and present it at 
trial to avoid restricting speech based on its speaker and content.200  For 
example, when a pharmaceutical representative emphasizes the benefits of 
off-label uses to a physician, evidence that the representative is paid on a 
commission basis for sales to the targeted doctor could be the actus reus for 
a conspiracy.  This is still a circumstances-of-sale argument, but now there is 
evidence of a conspiracy besides speech. 
Without evidence other than speech that shows a conspiracy to sell a 
misbranded drug, a drug company representative speaking to a doctor about 
off-label uses is not a crime.  The government can argue that the off-label 
promotion shows the intent to pay the representative for selling the drug for 
unapproved uses, thus providing the mens rea for a conspiracy.  If the 
representative is paid based on sales and off-label promotion is directed 
toward a doctor who will potentially buy the drug for off-label uses, a jury 
could determine that the commission is the act effectuating a conspiracy to 
sell a misbranded drug.  Speech is not on trial—instead, speech shows the 
motive for the crime and makes the drug misbranded.201  The conspiracy, by 
contrast, must be proven through some act other than speech, which results 
in the speech not being restricted based on its speaker and content.202 
Other potential evidence of a conspiracy could be a drug company 
reimbursing its representative for travel costs incurred to meet with a doctor 
to discuss off-label uses.  The speech in off-label promotion serves as 
evidence of the intent to sell a drug without adequate directions for use.  The 
actus reus for the conspiracy, however, relies on evidence other than the 
speaker and content of speech.  The manufacturer subsidized the 
representative’s expenses to sell a drug for unapproved uses, and the 
representative met with a potential purchaser of the drug and engaged in off-
label promotion only after receiving this subsidy.  Speech shows the motive 
for the subsidy while also making the drug misbranded for lacking adequate 
directions for use. 
Other potential acts that could serve as a proper actus reus include a 
representative giving free samples of a drug to a doctor and the existence of 
a sales quota that could be met only if the representative sold drugs for off-
 
 198. See supra note 182. 
 199. See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text. 
 200. See, e.g., supra notes 173, 175. 
 201. See supra note 91. 
 202. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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label uses.203  Once again, speech is not on trial.  Speech indicates that other 
activities occurred as part of a conspiracy to sell drugs for off-label uses and 
also makes the drugs misbranded. 
One common method of off-label promotion, discussions about how 
doctors can get reimbursed by insurance companies for off-label 
prescriptions,204 likely cannot be regulated.  When such discussions occur, 
speech is the only evidence of a conspiracy.  If the government alleges a 
conspiracy to sell a misbranded drug based on such a conversation, then the 
actus reus of the conspiracy must be speech—no other evidence to support a 
conspiracy exists.  The insurance reimbursement to the doctor is an act, but 
it is performed by the doctor, not the drug company or its representative.  The 
representative only spoke, so he or she would be alleged to be part of a 
conspiracy because of his or her speech.  In effect, speech would be 
criminalized—speaking to a doctor about insurance reimbursement would 
result in criminal liability, even if the representative did not perform any act 
as part of a conspiracy.  In a situation like this, the government must find 
evidence of some act on the representative’s part to support his or her role in 
a conspiracy.  If it does not, then mere discussions of insurance 
reimbursement for off-label uses between a pharmaceutical representative 
and a doctor would always result in criminal liability.  This is the type of 
content- and speaker-based restriction on speech that Sorrell and Caronia 
hold is subject to Central Hudson scrutiny. 
This analysis could lead drug manufacturers and their representatives to 
attempt to conceal all evidence of a conspiracy or to ensure that off-label 
promotion occurs only through speech.  In effect, the FDA would not be able 
to regulate off-label promotion when it consists of truthful, nonmisleading 
speech.  Based on Sorrell and Caronia, however, the government must 
introduce evidence other than speech at trial to prove a conspiracy to 
introduce a misbranded drug into interstate commerce.  The government 
cannot restrict truthful, nonmisleading speech based on its speaker and 
content.  Thus, the intended use-regulation must serve as an evidentiary tool 
and cannot be used to convict one of a misbranding crime based solely on 
truthful, nonmisleading speech.  While Caronia and Sorrell may lead to off-
label promotion effectively being beyond regulation if a drug company and 
its representatives conceal all nonspeech evidence of a conspiracy, the 
amended intended-use regulation can be used in the appropriate off-label 
promotion cases.  Using the rule to regulate off-label promotion is 
constitutional, even when the promotion consists of truthful, nonmisleading 
speech, as long as the government has evidence other than speech of a 
conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate commerce. 
 
 203. Off-Label Marketing of Medicines in the US Is Rife but Difficult to Control, PUB. LIBR. 
SCI. (Apr. 5, 2011), https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2011-04/plos-omo040111.php 
[https://perma.cc/995P-88WK]. 
 204. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment does not prevent the FDA from regulating the 
truthful, nonmisleading speech commonly used in off-label drug promotion.  
It has historically used the intended-use regulation to police such promotion, 
and it can continue to do so even after Caronia and Sorrell.  While its ability 
to regulate in this manner is not absolute, the First Amendment and the 
intended-use regulation give the FDA wide leeway to use speech as evidence 
in an intended-use case as long as speech is not the sole evidence of a 
misbranding crime.  Given the prevalence and legality of off-label drug 
usage, as well as the monetary incentives to promote drugs for unapproved 
uses, the FDA should use the amended regulation to ensure that consumers 
are prescribed drugs only when it is safe and effective to do so. 
 
